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[8. F. No. 16809. In Bank. June 1, 1943.] 
MERCURY HERALD COMPANY (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, v. MAURICE MOORE, as County Auditor, etc., 
Respondent. 
[1] Taxation-Sales-Redemption-Constitutionality of Statute-
Obligation of Contract.-Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3572-3575, pro-
viding for the termination, in the manner prescribed, of the 
right to redeem property tax-deeded to the state before June 1, 
1942, .do not impair the obligation of a contract, because no 
contract relationship exists between the taxpayer and the state. 
The taxpayer's position is not that of a purchaser who enters 
into a contract with the state in purchasing the property, and 
his failure to pay the tax leads to the sale of the land as an 
exercise of the sovereign power to collect the tax. 
I 
[2] Id.-Sales-Redemption-Distmctions.-There is a distinction 
between the absolute right to redeem within the fixed period 
of five years from the date of a sale to the state for unpaid 
taxes, and the conditional right to redeem once the property 
has been deeded to the state if the state does not sell the prop-
erty. Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3572-3575, affect the second right 
only. 
[3] Id. - Sales - Redemption-Conditional Right to Redeem.-
Upon execution of a deed to the state after a failure to redeem 
within five years from the date of a tax sale to the state, the 
property owner forfeited all rights in the property, except th.., 
privilege of redeeming it at any time before the state disposed 
of it. Such owner thereafter had at most an offer enabling 
him to regain title to the property, which offer could be re-
voked by the state at any time before acceptance. 
[4] Id.-Sales-Redemption-Changes in Method of Redemption. 
-While the law in effect at the time of a tax sale to the state 
governs the redemption of the property when the Legislature 
does not provide otherwise, the Legislature may make retroac-
tive changes in the method of redemption. Such changes, how-
ever, cannot be arbitrary or capricious, but must be reason-
able when measured in the light of the public interest to be 
served and the effect upon rights of the property owner.'· 
Those rights are not purely statutory and cannot be destroyed 
by the mere repeal of a statute. . 
[1] See 24 Cal.Jur. 333; 26 R.C.L. 427. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-5, 7, 8 J l'axation, § 329; [6 J Statutes, 
§ 33. 
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[5] Id.-Sales-Redemption-Rights of Property Owner-Notice 
Before Forfeiture.-By proviuing for the redemption of prop-
erty after sale to the state in the event of a tax delinquency, 
the state does not take the property outright from the owner, 
but allows him to retain the title and the right to remove the 
tax lien and clear his title to the property. l'he mere fact that 
the state could provide in the first instance for the complete 
taking of property does not mean that the state may with im-
punity provide retroactively for such a taking without giving 
the owner notice or a fair opportunity to prevent forfeiture of 
his property. 
[6] Statutes-Legislative Power-Limit the Time to Exercise. 
Existing Right.-The Legislature may validly limit the time 
within which an existing right may be exercised if the pe-
riod remaining for its assertion is a reasonable one. 
[7] Taxation-Sales-Redemption-Validity of Statute Changing 
Method of Redemption.-Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3572-3575, 
changing the method of redemption of property tax-deeded to 
the state by requiring termination of the right of redemp-
tion within one year from the date the legislation became 
effective instead of permitting said right to continue until 
termination by sale, which might nevel' occur, and giving 
the redemptioner four months' notice before termination, do 
not arbitrarily deprive him of a property right without due 
process of law, but afford him adequate notice and a fair 
opportunity to regain the property. 
[8] Id.-Sales-Redemption-Method of Disposing of Tax-deeded 
Property.-A person having the privilege of redemption has no 
right to a particular kind of disposition of tax-deeded prop-
erty, and may not make an objection that the termination must 
be by sale. The state may retain the property and terminate 
the right of redemption by giving the former owner as much 
notice as he would receive if the state sold the property to 
others. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the county auditor 
of Santa Clara County to issue a warrant. Writ granted. 
Francis A. Zingheim and Che::;ley M. Douglas for Petition-
ers. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, H. H. Linney, As-
sistant Attorney General, Adrian A. Kragen, Deputy Attor-
ney General, J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel (Los Angeles), 
A. CUl·tis Smith, Deputy County Counsel, Paul A. McCarthy, 
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John P. Fitzgerald, District Attorney (Santa Clara), and 
Leonard R. Avilla, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent. 
City Attorney (Redwood City), Ernest A. Wilson, City At-
torney (San Mateo), and Kirkbride & 'Vilson as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Petitioners. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner seeks by this proceeding in 
mandamus to compel the auditor of Santa Clara County to 
issue a warrant in payment of a claim for the publication 
of a notice to terminate the right of redemption pursuant 
to section 3574 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. 
The real property described in the published notice was 
sold to the state on June 29, 1935, for nonpayment of county 
taxes for 1934-35. The law at that time required the tax col-
lector to publish an annual delinquent list of property on 
which taxes for the past year wer~ not paid. If the taxes re-
mained unpaid the property was sold to the state. The prac-
tical effect of such a sale was to start the running of the 
five-year period of redemption. (Orocker v. Scott, 149 Cal. 
575 [87 P. 102] ; In re Seick, 46 Cal.App. 363 [189 P. 314].) 
If the property was not redeemed within the five years, or 
if the taxpayer failed to elect on or before April 20, 1936, 
to pay the delinquent taxes in installments (Pol. Code, sec. 
3817c(3) ; extended to April 20, 1940, by Pol. Code, sec. 3817e 
(7), Stats. 1939, ch. 9) the property was deeded to the state. 
(Pol. Code, sec. 3785.) Thereafter, under the law in effect 
when the property in question was deeded to the state on 
July 1, 1940, the property could be sold by the tax collector 
at public auction upon the direction of the board of super-
visors of the county and the authorization of the State Con-
troller, if notice of sale was mailed to the last assessee at 
least 21 days but not more than 28 days before the proposed 
sale, and notice thereof p~blished once a week for three weeks 
starting at least 21 days before the sale. (Pol. Code, secs. 
3833-3834.25.) If the state did not dispose of the property it 
remained subject to redemption. (Pol. Code secs. 3817c (3),,· 
3780.) 
In 1941 the Legislature provided for the termination of 
the right of redemption upon execution of the deed to the 
state as to all property not in distressed assessment districts, 
deeded to the state on and after June 1, 1942. (Rev. and Tax. 
) 
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Code, secs. 3511.3, 3511.5.) If the deed to the state was ex.-
ecuted before June 1, 1942, as in the present case, notice of 
termination must be mailed ~o the last ~sessee within one 
year after June 1, 1942, or within six months after default 
under a plan of installment payments, whichever of the two 
dates is later. (Rev. and Tax Code, sec. 3572.) The tax col-
lector must also publish the notice of termination of right of 
redemption once in a newspapcr of general circulation pub-
lished in the county, or, if none, by posting in three con-
spicuous places in the county, as to every assessee for whom no 
address is known, and for all property assessed to unknown 
owners. 'fhe publication must be made within 10 days after 
the notice is mailed. (Rev. and Tax. Code, sec. 3574.) If the 
property is not redeemed or installment payments commenced 
within four months after sending the notice, the right of re-
demption is terminated. (Rev. and Tax. Code, sec. 3575.) 
Since the legislation became effective June 1, 1941, the pro-
cedure that it established could not be set in motion for a 
year or more. 
These provisions are an integral part of a plan to classify 
and rehabilitate tax-deeded property. The Legislature also 
provided for the appointment of a Land Classification Com-
mission familiar with agricultural economics, real property 
taxation, conservation and regional planning, to classify tax-
deeded property as desirable for public use, suitable for 
private ownership, or wa.~te land, (Chap. 47, Stats, 1st Extra 
Session, 1940, Stats. 1941, p. 131.) The statute seeks to expc-
dite the restoration of real property to the tax rolls. To that 
end it provides for the termination of the right of redemption 
to facilitate the use or rehabilitation of tax-deeded land while 
enabling the state to dispose of it more quickly and at a better 
price. 
[1] It is contended that the termination of the right of 
redemption of the property here in question impairs the 
obligation of a contract. There is no contractual relationship, 
however, between the taxpayer and the state. (Southern Serv-
ice Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 15 Ca1.2d 1, 11 [97 P.2d 
963] ; Perry v. ·Washburn, 20 Cal. 318, 350; Spurrier v. Neu-
miller, 37 Cal.App. 683 [174 P. 338].) The position of the 
taxpayer is not that of a purchaser who enters into a con-
tract with the state in purchasing the property, The tax-
payer's own failure to pay the tax leads to the sale of the 
) 
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land as an exercise of the sovereign power to collect the tax. 
(lVood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 371 [61 S.Ct. 938, 85 L.Ed 
1404] ; Yates v. Hawkins, 46 N.M. 249 [126 P.2d 476, 478] : 
see Anglo California Nat. Bank v. Leland, 9 Ca1.2d 347 [70 
P.2d 937] ; Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 380, 386; JI'lli1'head v. 
Bands, 111 Mich. 487 [69 N.W. 826, 828].) 
[2] It is also contended that the right to redeem after 
the property has been deeded to the state but before it has 
been sold by the state is a property right, and that the legis-
lation in question deprives the property owner of that right 
without due process of law. This contention takes no account 
of the distinction between the absolute right to redeem within 
the fixed period of five years from the date of sale to the 
state, and the conditional right to redeem once the property 
has been deeded to the state if the state does not sell the 
property. The deed to the state upon the expiration of the 
five-year period conveyed absolute' title to the property free 
of any incumbrance except liens for certain taxes. (Pol. Code, 
sec. 3787; Rev. & Tax. Code, sec. 3520.) [3] Upon execution of 
the deed the property owner forfeited all rights in the prop-
erty except the privilege of redeeming it at any time before 
the state disposed of it. (Buck v. Canty, 162 Cal. 226 [121 P. 
924] ; Fox v. Wright, 152 Cal. 59 [91 P. 1005] ; Baird v. Mon-
roe, 150 Cal. 560 [89 P. 352] ; Helvey v. Bank of America, 43 
Cal.App.2d 532 [111 P.2d 390] ; Curtin v. Kingsb'llry, 31 Cal. 
App. 57, 61 [159 P. 830] ; Chapman v. Zobelein, 19 Cal.App. 
132 [124 P. 1021], aff'd 237 U.S. 135 [35 8.Ct. 518, 59 L.Ed., 
874] ; Young v. Patterson, 9 Cal.App. 469 [99 P. 552].> The 
property owner thereafter had at most an offer enabling him 
to regain title to the property, which could be revoked by 
the state at any time before acceptance. As the court stated 
in Buck v. Oanty, supra, "The Legislature has full control 
over the sale of property belonging to the state, which it may 
direct sold, and to regulate or change at any time the method 
of its disposition." (162 Cal. 226,233.) In Bouth Ban Joaquin 
Irrigation District v. Neumiller, 2 Ca1.2d 485 [42 P.2d 64L 
the court reaffirmed the rule that the taxpayer had no vested 
right in the method adopted by the state for the disposition of 
its tax-deeded lands. The court declared: "The question is 
therefore narrowed -to this: Does the person possessing a right 
to redeem also have a vested or such a substantial right in the 
method or conditions adopted by the state for the disposition 
) 
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by it of its tax deeded lands as would deprive the state of the 
power to change the method and terms of sale thereof, after 
it had received title to the lands T ••• In the absence of eon-
stitutional limitations, and there is none here, the legislature 
is free to dispose of the state's tax deeded lands in any way 
deemed by it from time to time to be for the public interest . 
. . . It is clear from all the authorities and on reason that 
the person having the privilege of redemption has no right 
to the disposition by the state of its tax deeded lands in any 
particular way when, as here, his right of· redemption is not 
adversely affected." (2 Cal.2d 485, 489. See Allen v. Peterson, 
38 Wash. 599 [80 P. 849].) 
[4] Even if there were no distinction between the right 
to redeem before deed to the state and after, a change in the 
method of redemption would not necessarily be contrary to 
due process of law. While the law in effect at the time of the 
sale to the state governs the redemption of the property when 
the Legislature does not provide otherwise, it is settled that the 
Legislature may make retroactive changes in the method of 
redemption. (Buck v. Canty, supra; Fox v. Wright, supra; 
Ba·ird v. Monroe, supra,· Wood v. Lovett, supra; League v. 
Texas, 184 U.S. 156 [22 S.Ct. 475, 46 L.Ed. 478].) This power 
is not unlimited, however. The changes cannot be arbitrary 
or capricious but must be reasonable when measured in the 
light of the public interest to be served and the effect of the 
changes upon the rights of the property owner. Those rights 
are not purely statutory and cannot be destroyed by the 
mere repeal of a statute. ( ct. Pol. Code, sec. 327; Southern 
Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, supra; Penziner v. West 
American Finance Co., 10 Ca1.2d 160 [74 P.2d 252] ; Krause 
v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644 [293 P. 62, 77 A.L.R. 1327] ; Berg v. 
Traeger, 210 Cal. 323 [292 P. 495] ; Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 
65 [290 P. 438] ; Moss v. Smith, 171 Cal. 777 [155 P. 90] ; 
People v. Bank of San Lu.is Obispo, 159 Cal. 65 [112 P. 866, 
Ann.Cas.1912B, 1148, 37 L.R.A.N.S. 934] ; Napa State Hos-
pital v. Flaherty, 134 Cal. 315 [66 P. 322].) At the time of 
the imposition of the tax the property is in private owner-
ship, and the rights of the owner in that property, not being 
derived from statute, cannot be abrogated at wi1l by the 
Legislature. When the tax is imposed the state prescribes the 
terms of payment and the conditions under which the property 
will be taken for nonpayment of the tax. [5] By providing 
) 
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for the redemption of the property after sale to the state in 
the event of delinquency, the state does not take the property 
outright from the owner but allows him not only to retain the 
title but the right to remove the tax lien and clear his title 
to the property. It does not follow that bceause the state 
could provide in the first instance for a complete taking of 
the property that it mny with impunity provide retroactively 
for such a taking without giving the owner notice or a fair 
opportunity to prevent forfeiture of his property. (See Wood 
v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 371 [61 S.Ct. 938, 85 L.Ed. 1404].) 
[6] It is settled, however, that the Le::ri.,lature may validly 
limit the time within which an existing right may be exercised 
if the period remaining for its assertion is a reasonable one. 
(Alexander, Inc. v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th) 128 F.2d 82; 
Allen v. Peterson, supra; Robinson v. Howe, supra; Muirhead 
v. Sands, supra.) This rule is akin to the rule that the Legis-
lature may enact a statute of limi~ations applicable to exist-
ing causes of action or shorten a former limitation period if 
the time allowed to commence the action is reasonable. (Se-
curity-First Nat. Bank v. Sartori, 34 Cal.App.2d 408, 414,415 
[93 P.2d 863] ; see 16 Cal.Jur. 398; 34 Am.Jur. 44.) 
[7] In the present case the redemptioner clearly received 
adequate notice and a fair opportunity to regain the prop-
erty. His position was in fact improved in several respects: 
OLD METHOD NEW METHOD 
1. Right of redemption ter-
minated by sale at any 
time upon proper notice. 
2. Twenty-one days' notice 
by mail and by pUblication. 
3. Right of redemption con-
tinues until terminated by 
sale; state not required to 
sell 
1. One year's delay before 
procedure became opera-
tive. 
2. Four months' notice by 
mail before termination; 
notice by publication with-
in 10 days after notice 
mailed. 
3. Right of redemption must 
be terminated by June 1, 
1943, if property not re-
deemed or installment pay-
ments begun before that 
time. 
The delay of a year in the new procedure unquestionably 
operates to the advantage of the taxpayer. Likewise, a four-
... 
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months' notice is more advantageous to him than a twenty-
one days' notice. As for the third difference, the Legislature 
could have provided that all tax-deeded p:coperty be sold by 
June 1, 1943, since it is free to determine what property 
shall or shall not be sold and when. (Bray v. Jones, 20 Cal.2d 
858 [129 P.2d 364] ; South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. 
Neumiller, supra; Buck v. Oanty, supra; Merchants' Trust 00. 
v. Wright, 161 Cal. 149 [118 P. 517] ; Fox v. Wright, supra.) 
From the standpoint of the redemptioner's right there is 
little if anything to choose between such a provision and the 
one in question. [8] Any objection that the termination must be 
by sale is met by the holding in South San Joaquin Irriga-
tion District v. Neumiller, supra, that the person having the 
privilege of redemption has no right to a particular kind of 
disposition of tax-deeded property. The state would normally 
l:icek to sell the property to return it to the tax rolls. While 
it may delay in doing so the taxpayer under the old method 
could not rely on such delay with any certainty and con-
fidently bide his time to redeem. Any hope he might have had 
of redeeming advantageously by waiting rested on mere spec-
ulation as to what the state would do. It was not grounded in 
any legal right, for the state had the unqualified right to sell 
at any time and for any price and thus terminate the right of 
redemption. (Buck v. Oanty, supra; Fox v. Wright, supra; 
Baird v. Monroe, supra.) 
It was held in South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. 
Neumiller, supra, that the state can change the method of 
disposing of tax-deeded property after receiving the title 
thereto, by selling the property to a municipality, irrigation 
district, reclamation district, or other public corporation for 
such price and upon such terlIlS as may be agreed upon and 
thercby terminatc the right of redemption. It can likewise 
terminate the right of redamption by selling the property to 
a public corporation created to administer tax-deeded prop-
erty. Just as appropriately the state can retain the property 
directly and terminate the right of redemption by giving the 
former owner as much notice as he would receive if the state 
sold the property to others. 
In the cases upon which respondent relies the legislation 
in question either substantially impaired the right of redemp-
tion without reasonable justification or involved only ques-
tions of statutory construction. In Peralta Land & W. 00. v. 
Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518 [48 P. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 194], the new 
act increased the amount required to redeem. Collier v. Shaf-
) 
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fer, 137 Cal. 319 [70 P. 177], was concerned with the con-
struction of the statute and not with the constitutionality of 
any retroactive application thereof. The new law involved in 
Biaggi v. Ramont, 189 Cal. 675 [209 P. 892], and Risso v. 
Crooks, 217 Cal. 219 [17 P.2d 1001], did not purport to be 
retroactive and its constitutionality was therefore not in ques-
tion. San Diego Oounty v. Ohilds, 217 Cal. 109 [17 P.2d 734], 
and Oounty of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.2d 192 [44 P.2d 
340, 100 A.L.R. 149], concerned acts for refunding certain 
obligations of districts organized under the Acquisition and 
Improvement Act of 1925. They provided for radical changes 
in the right of property owners to redeem lands that had 
been sold for delinquent assessments, including reductions in 
the redemption period from five years to one year as well as 
additions to the amount necessary to redeem. (Of. Oounty of 
Los Angeles v. Jones, 6 Cal.2d695 [59 P.2d 489]; Oity of 
Dunsmuir v. Porter, 7 Cal.2d 269 [60 P.2d 836] ; Oity of Los 
Angeles v. Aldrich, 8 Ca1.2d 541 [-66 P.2d 647] ; Oulver Oity 
v. Reese, 11 Cal.2d 441 [80 P.2d 992].) 
King v. Samuel, 7 Cal.App. 55 [93 P. 391] ; Wetherbee Y. 
Johnston, 10 Cal.App. 264 [101 P. 802], and Main v. Thorn-
ton, 20 Cal.App. 194 [128 P. 766], were based upon Johnson 
v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201 [88 P. 903, 119 Am.St.Rep. 181, 10 
L.R.A.N.S. 818], upon which the defendant relies particu-
larly. This case involved the validity of a tax deed made in 
1899 pursuant to a sale in 1894. Under the law in effect when 
the sale was made the purchaser had to serve written notice 
upon the owner or occupant thirty days before the right of 
redemption expired or thirty days before applying for a deed. 
A deed could not be issued to the purchaser without the giv-
ing of this notice. The owner retained title until the execu-
tion of such dee<l and had at least one year after the sale 
and until thirty days after notice in which to redeem. In 
1895 the Legislature adopted substantially the present sys-
tem, providing that property be sold for delinquent taxes to 
the state, and if not redeemed within five years be deeded to 
the state, and that thereafter redemption might be made 
before entry or sale of the property by the state. In referring 
to this change the court declared: "To change a right of 
redemption which lasts indefinitely until the performance by 
a third party of some act which mayor may not be per-
formed, to a riglit limited by the expiration of a definite 
period of time is a substantial change in the right." Re-
) 
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spondent relies heavily upon this sentence, inferring a com-
parison between the right to redeem after deed to the state 
until thc state sells, with the right under the old law in the 
Johnson case to redeem within thirty days' after the service 
of the notice. Actually the court found no basis for such a 
comparison, for it clearly regarded the right of redemption 
after the close of the five-year period as too insubstantial to 
be measured against the previously existing right, and meas-
ured instead the five-year period, only to find it also inferior. 
It wonld be inconsistent now to give the right formerly re-
garded as insubstantial the same value as the right formerly 
regarded as impaired. Even if the sentence in the Johnson case, 
relied upon by respondent, were lifted from the context of the 
facts before the court and read literally it would have no bear-
ing upon the present case, where the right of redemption under 
the old law was terminated by the act, not of a third person 
without title to the property, but of the state itself as holder of 
the absolute title. (South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. 
Neumiller, supra.) The Johnson case involved the basic right 
of a property owner to receive notice of the prospective loss 
of title to his property. The notice did not terminate the 
right of redemption as sale by the state did, but gave warning 
that the right would be terminated if the owner did not re-
deem. "Under the old law the owner could rest secure until 
, he received notice of intention to apply for a deed. He then 
had thirty days in which to redeem. Under the new law his 
right of redemption could be cut off at any moment after the 
expiration of the statutory period, without any personal noti-
fication to him . . . That these circumstances worked a 
substantial change in the rights which the owner had at the 
date of the sale seems clear." The impairment of the right in 
the Johnson case is in striking contrast to the absence of any 
proof of impairment in the present case. 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue. 
Gibson, C. J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J. concurring.-I agree that a delinquent tax-
payer has no vested right in an existing proceuure for the 
collection of taxes. (Wood v. Lo'vett, 313 U.S. 362, 371 [61 
S.Ct. 938, 85 L.Ed. 1404) j League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158 
[22 S.Ct. 475, 46 L.Ed. 478].) There is no contract between 
him and the state that the latter will not vary the method of 
) 
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collection. (lVood v. Lovett, SUp1"a, p. 371; League v. Texas, 
su.pra, p. 158.) Nor does a statute changing the procedure 
for the collection of unpaid taxes conflict with the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Consti-
tution merely because it is retroactive in operation. (League 
v. Texas, supra, p. 161; Wood v. Lovett, supra, p. 371.) ~'or 
these reasons the Supreme Court of the United States has 
held that a state constitutionally may impose interest upon 
delinquent taxes by a law enacted subsequent to the time of 
their accrual. (League v. Texas, supra.) 
The due process clause does, however, prevent the state 
from taking one's liberty or property in an unreasonable and 
arbitrary manner. The private ownership of real property 
normally does not exist by virtue of a statutory grant, and 
the owner is entitled to notice of the fact that his property 
will be forfeited if he is delinquent in his obligations to the 
state. Prior to the enactment of t1!e 1941 legislation, under 
the law governing the collection of taxes, the landowner was 
informed that only certain rights in his property immediately 
would be taken if he failed to pay the taxes levied upon it 
when due; that certain additional rights would be taken upon 
a default in payment of his tax obligations during the next 
five years, and his title forfeited if he did not pay the ac-
crued amounts before the property was sold for taxes by the 
state to another. (Rev. & Tax. Code, pts. 6, 7.) And although 
no constitutional limitation requires the state to abide by 
these conditions for the collection of the tax, procedural due 
process demands that it must, in altering the procedure, give 
adequate notice of the change so as to afford the taxpayer 
a fair opportunity to prevent forfeiture of his property. 
(Wood v. Lovett, supra, p. 371; League v. Texas, supra, p. 
158; and see Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings 00. v. Hill, 
281 U.S. 673 [50 S.Ct. 451, 74 L.Ed. 1107].) 
Sections 3571-78 of the Revenue & Taxation Code are in ac-
cord with these principles. They do not arbitrarily deprive 
the delinquent taxpayer of his remaining interest in his prop-
erty but afford him adequate notice that his rights will be 
terminated if he does not cure his default within a period 
which affords him a fair opportunity to prevent the forfeiture. 
The Constitution requires nothing more in this regard. 
I am not, however, convinced that the new legislation has 
improved the delinquent taxpayer's position or conferred 
upon him benefits equally as advantageous as those existing 
) 
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uuder the prior procedure. To me, the declaration of Mr. 
Justice Traynor to this effect is patently inconsistent with 
his statement that the new policy embodies a plan to classify 
und rehabilitate tax-deeded property by expediting the res-
toration of real property to the tax rolls through the termina-
tion of the theretofore continuing right of redemption. 
Whether a change from a conditional right of redemption 
which might continue indefinitely and, in any event, may not 
be terminated until after 21 days' notice is less desirable than 
an unconditional right to redeem within one year from the 
date the 1941 legislation became effective, is a question upon 
which reasonable minds may differ. I therefore place my con-
currence in the judgment upon the sole ground that the new 
procedure is a reasonable regulation of the method for col-
lection of taxes by the state. 
CARTER, J., concurring.-The question presented for 
"onsideration is whether section 3574 of the Revenue and 
rraxation Code, adopted by the Legislature in 1941, imposeR 
more onerous conditions upon the right to redeem property 
from a delinquent tax sale made prior to the adoption of such 
section, and if so, did the Legislature have the power to im-
pose such conditions so as to affect the right of redemption of 
property covered by such prior sales 1 
In my opinion, said section does impose more onerous con-
ditions on the right of redemption, as it purports to limit the 
time within which redemption may be made to a period of 
four months after notice instead of permitting the owner 
to exercise the right of redemption at any time until the prop-
erty is sold by the state to a third person. Such being the 
case, I shall proceed with the consideration of the question as 
to whether or not the Legislature had the power to impose 
such conditions so as to affect tax sales made prior to the 
adoption of such section. 
This court has held in numerous cases, and it appears to 
be in agreement with the weight of authority, that the general 
relationship of sovereign and taxpayer is not founded on, nor 
does it create, any contractual rights; and the obligation of 
the citizen to pay taxes is purely of statutory creation, and 
taxes can be levied, assessed and collected only in the method 
provided by express statute. (Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. 
Los Angeles, 15 Ca1.2d 1, 11 [97 P.2d 963] ; Perry v. Wash· 
burn, 20 Cal. 318; Spurrier v. Neumiller, 37 Cal.App. 683 
[174 P. 338].) It has also been held by this court that the 
,) 
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power of taxation is not founded upon consent or agreement 
but, rather, that tax proceedings are in invitum, and has given 
that as its reason why all tax proceedings should be strictly 
construed. Judge Cooley in his work on taxation points out 
that as between the owner of property and the sovereign 
power imposing the tax there is no relationship based upon 
contract and that as to the owner, "the remedy by redemption 
which the statute gives him, like remedies in general, is sub-
ject to legislative discretion." (Cooley on Taxation, vol. 4, 
4th ed., sec. 1561, p. 3068.) 
Section 327 of the Political Code reads as follows: 
"Any statute may be repealed at any time, except when 
it is otherwise provided therein. Persons acting under any 
statute are deemed to have acted in contemplation of this 
power of repeal." 
It appears to be well settled in this state that the right of 
recovery upon a purely statutory right can be impaired or 
abrogated without violation of any right guaranteed by tl," 
state or federal Constitutions. U~outhern Service 00., Ltd. '". 
Los Angeles, supra; Penziner v. West American Finance 00 .. 
10 Ca1.2d 160 [74 P.2d 252] ; Krause v. Rm'ity, 210 Cal. 64-1 
f293 P. 62, 77 A.L.R. 1327]; Berg v. Traeger, 210 Cal. 32:1 
[292 P. 495] ; Oallet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 [290 P. 438] ; Moss 
v. Smith, 171 Cal. 777 [155 P. 90]; People v. Bank of San 
Luis Obispo, 159 Cal. 65 [112 P. 866, Ann.Cas.1912B 1148, 
37 L.R.A.N.S. 934]; Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty, 134 
Cal. 315 [66 P. 322].) 
The rule estab~shed by these cases is clearly stated by this 
court in the case of Krause v. Rarity, supra, at page 652, as 
follows: 
"The defendant Rarity contends that by reason of th e 
enactment of the foregoing statute the cause of action of the 
plaintiffs has been wiped out; that section 377 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure and section 2096 of the Civil Code have been 
repealed in whole or in part by the enactment of section 
141% of the California Vehicle Act and that the rule of law 
to be applied is laid down in such cases as People v. Bank of 
Ban Luis Obispo, 159 Ca1..65 [Ann.Cas.1912B 1148, 37 L.R.A.' 
N.S. 934, 112 P. 866]; Wilcox v. Edwards, 162 Cal. 455 
[Ann.Cas.1913C 1392, 123 P. 276] ; Moss v. Smith, 171 Cal. 
777 [155 P. 90] ; ii'reeman v. Glenn County Tel. 00., 184 Cal. 
508 [194 P. 705], and Chenoweth v. Chambers, 33 Cal.App. 
104 [164 P. 428]. By those cases the rule obtaining elsewhere 
... 
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has become thoroughly established in the law of this state 
that when a right of action do~ not exist at common law, 
but depends solely upon a statute, the re{>eal of the statute 
destroys the right unless the right has been reduced to final 
judgment or unless the repealing statute contains a saving 
clause protecting the right in a pending litigation. In the case 
at bar the cause of action depended solely on the statute. 
There is no saving clause and the action is still pending." 
In the case of Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty, supra, at 
page 317, the rule is thus stated: 
"It is a rule of almost universal application that, where 
a right is created solely by a statute, and is dependent upon 
the statute alone, and such right is still inchoate, and not 
reduced to possession, or perfected by final judgment, the 
repeal of the statute destroys the remedy, unless the appealing 
statute contains a saving clause." 
It appears to be a rule of universal acceptation that the 
clause of the federal Constitution and those of the several 
state Constitutions prohibiting the impairment of obliga-
tions of contracts runs only to conventional contracts created 
by the mutual consent of the parties and not to quasi-con-
tractual obligations imposed by the law and without procur-
ing the consent of the party to be charged. (Lou.isiana v. 
Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 [3 8.0t. 211, 27 L.Ed. 
936] ; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U.S. 405 [9 S.Ot. 763, 33 
JJ.Ed. 193] ; Garris01" v. Oity of New York, 21 Wall. 196, at 
203 [22 L.Ed 612] ; Orane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 146 [42 
8.0t. 214, 66 L.Ed. 514, 517] ; Read v. Mississippi Oounty, 69 
Ark. 365 [63 S.W. 807, 86 Am.St.Rep. 202] (a1f'd. 188 U.S. 
739 [23 8.0t. 849, 47 L.Ed. 677]) ; State v. New Orleans, 38 
La.Ann. 119 [58 Am.Rep. 168] ; Love v. Cavett, 26 Okla. 179 
[109 P. 553] ; Nottage v. O'ity of Portland, 35 Ore. 539 [58 P. 
883, 76 Am.St.Rep. 513] ; Anders v. Nicholson, 111 Fla. 849 
[150 So. 639] ; State v. Smith, 58 S.D. 22 [234 N.W. 764].) 
I am persuaded by the reasoning contained in the fore-
g'oing authorities that the tax liability of the owner of prop-
erty is not predicatcd upon contract; that it is wholly of 
statutory creation and all rights and privileges granted to the 
property owner in connection therewith, including the en-
forcement of such rights, are founded upon statutory enact-
ment, and such rights may be limited or entirely abrogated 
by the IJegislature without violating constitutional provisions 
prohibiting the impairment of obligations of contracts. 
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Respondent relies most strongly upon the case of Temlta 
Land &- Water Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518 [48 P. 613, 58 
Am.St.Rep. 194], in support of his contention that section 
3574 of the Revenue Taxation Act is unconstitutional as being 
in violation of the impairment of contracts clauses of the 
state and federal Constitutions. While that case contains 
language supporting respondent's position, it does not go as 
far as is necessary to support the position taken by respon-
dent in this case. The reasoning of the Teralta case was 
based upon decisions from other states and opinions of text 
writers dealing with the rights of purchasers from the state 
of tax-deeded lands. There can be no question but that such 
transactions rested upon contract and the rights of the pur-
chasers therein were contractual and vested under ordinary 
common-law principles. The rule announced in the Teralta 
case is thoroughly sound, but was not applicable to the set 
of facts then before the court. The difference between sales 
to the state and sales to individuals has been discussed by 
this court in the case of Anglo California Nat. Bank v. 
Leland, 9 Cal.2d 347 [70 P.2d 937]. But such distinction was 
not drawn in the Teralta case. An examination of the authori-
ties relied upon in the Teralta case discloses that they do 
not support a rule applicable to the facts of that case. The 
decisions from other states are cited without any statement 
of facts, and with only one quotation from the cases and, 
hence, their inapplicability to the particular facts then before 
this court is not apparent until such cases are read and 
analyzed. 1'he cases of Merrill v. Dearing, 32 Minn. 479 [21 
N.W. 721] ; Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 380 (cited in the opin-
ion as 13 Wis. 341), Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82 [87 Am.Dec. 
240], and Wolfe v. Henderson, 28 Ark. 304, all involved situ-
ations where the property was conveyed by tax deed to an 
individual rather than to a state. In addition, the Wisconsin 
case involved an extension of time to redeem rather than a 
shortening of the period, and the Arkansas case actually 
turned upon a question of statutory construction. The other 
Minnesota case, Goer:nen v. 8chroeder, B Minn. 344 (cited iIi 
the opinion as B Minn. 387), did not involve a tax deed at . 
all but involved 8 mortgage. The Iowa case, Negus v. Yancey, 
22 Iowa 57, not only fai1s to support the Teralta case but 
holds quite to the contrary. True, the last cited case holds 
that the law in effect at the time of the sale controls, but 
the problem before the court did not involve a change in the 
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law after the sale but a change in the law before the sale, 
and the question was whether the law at the time taxes 
accrue or the law in effect at the time. of the sale should 
control. The court held that the redemptioner was bound 
by the change in the law, ... the reason given, at page 
59 of the opinion, being, "He (the redemptioner) has 
no vested rights.or privileges in the terms or provisions of the 
law under which he is a defaulter." 
The case of Moody v. Hoskins, 64 Miss. 468 [1 So. 622], 
involved a situation where the right of redemption was ter-
minated instantly by the repeal of a redemption statute with-
out allowing a reasonable time, or any time, for the taxpayer 
to save his property. The court, without any citation of 
authority and relying only upon the injustice of such a stat-
ute, held it to be invalid. The other Mississippi case, Caruthers 
v. McLaran, 56 Miss. 371, involved only a question of statutory 
eonstruction. 
Thus we find that not one of the cases cited supports the 
l!onclusion reached in the 'reralta case, but, to the extent 
that they are applicable at all, go no further than to hold 
that where a tax sale is made to a private party, contractual 
and vested rights arise. And one case, not involving a deed 
loan individual, expressly held that the redemptioner was 
lJound by the change in the law (Negus v. Yancey, supra.) 
It is quite apparent, therefore, that the line of decisions 
represented by the Teralta case resulted from a failure to 
Ilistinguish between sales to the state and sales to private 
parties, and that the distinction noted by this court in the 
Anglo California National Bank case requires the overruling 
of the Teralta case. 
The precise problem involved in this case was recently con-
sidered by the Supreme Court of Michigan (Baker v. State 
Land Office Board (1940), 294 Mich. 587 [293 N.W. 763]). 
In that case the court said at page 767: 
"Nor is Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1893, as amended, un-
constitutional as an ex post facto law, impairing the obliga-
tion of contract, as claimed by petitioner. Under the express 
provisions of the general property tax law of 1893, as amended 
by Act No. 325, Pub. Acts 1937, title to all lands within the 
borders of the State that had been sold and bid in by the 
State became vested in the State upon expiration of the 18-
month period of redemption. It is ('on tended that prior to the 
amending act the periotl of redemption was five years; that 
I 
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such an amendment, cutting off title of the owners in a lesser 
period of time, cannot apply retrospectively to taxes levied 
before the amendment. Counsel apparently refers to 1 Compo 
Laws 1929, sec. 3520, as amended by Act No. 250, Pub. 
Acts 1933, which requires that lands be delinquent in taxes 
for a period of five years before the State can acquire title. 
The right of redemption, however, is not a constitutional 
right, but exists only as permitted by statute. Keely V. Sand-
ers, 99 U.S. 441, 25 L.Ed. 327; Durnphey v. Hilton, 121 Mich. 
315, 80 N.W. 1. Laws of retroactive character, affecting tax 
liens which attached prior to such an enactment, are not un-
constitutional. Oity of Detroit v. Safety Investment Oorp., 
288 Mich. 511, 285 N.W. 42; and statutes affecting such liens, 
shortening the time previously fixed for sale or redemption, 
affect only a remedy for the delinquency of the taxpayer and 
do not impair contract obligations or vested rights. See Muil'-
head v. Sands, 111 Mich. 487, 69 N.W. 826; Board of Super-
visors v. Hubinger, 137 Mich. 72, 100 N.W. 261, Ann.Cas. 
792; Harsha v. City of Detroit, 261 Mich. 586, 246 N.W. 849, 
90 A.L.R. 853." 
In conclusion, and to summarize the views expressed in the 
foregoing opinion, the relationship of sovereign and taxpayer 
is purely statutory and is not founded on contract, and the 
Legislature has the power at its discretion to change the mode 
or method of assessing, levying and collecting taxes, including 
the termination of the owner's right of redemption from 
delinquent tax sales; that section 3574 of the Revenue and 
Taxation Code does not constitute a violation of any consti-
tutional provision and is a valid exercise of the legislative 
power; that the case of Teralta Land &1 Water 00. v. Shaffer, 
116 Cal. 518 [~8 P. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 194], and any other 
cases in this state which purport to follow the erroneous 
doctrine announced in that case should be overruled, and 
that petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandate prayed for 
in its petition in this case. 
SHENK, J .-1 dissent. In my opinion the legislation under 
consideration provides for a shortening of the period of re--
demption fixed by the law in force at the time of the sale 
for delinquent taxes. The question whether the shortening 
of that period is a substantial impairment of the redemption-
er's right cannot be answered by the citation of cases whic) I 
declare that the Legislature may change the method of re-
... 
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dernption. It is not the method, but the period of redemption 
which is involved. Neither may it properly be said that the 
right of the redemptioner is amplified l}ecause he is given 
more notice when his period of redemption is terminated by 
public declaration than when it is terminated by sale to a third 
person. Such a pronouncement assumes the point in issue, 
namely, that the redemptioner's right may be cut off at an 
earlier time than that provided by the law in force at the 
time of the sale to the state. 
The case of South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. Neu-
miller, 2 Ca1.2d 485 [42 P.2d 64], relied on by the majority, 
involved only the question whether the state could dispose of 
its tax-deeded lands at private sale for cash or on credit. The 
decision in that case was that the redemptioner had no right 
to the disposition by the state of its tax-deeded lands in any 
particular way when his right of redemption was not ad-
versely affected. This court there expressly recognized that 
the question of the legislative power to shorten the period of 
redemption was not involved. 
The rule that the law in force at the time of the sale for 
delinquent taxes governs the right of redemption and that 
the shortening of the period of redemption is a substantial 
impairment of that right has been the law of this state from 
an early period. It became and has remained a rule of prop-
erty. Tax deeds have been voided for failure to comply with 
it, and real property titles have been adjusted on the strength 
of it. The cases are legion on the subject, a few of which are 
the following: Teralta Land ctc. 00. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518 
[48 P. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 194] ; Oollier v. Shaffer, 137 Cal. 
319, 321 [70 P. 177] ; Johnson v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201 [88 P. 
903, 119 Am.St.Rep. 181, 10 L.R.A.N.S. 818] ; Biaggi v. Ra-
mont, 189 Cal. 675 [209 P. 892]; Oounty of San Diego v. 
Childs, 217 Cal. 109 [17 P.2d 734] ; Risso v. Orooks, 217 Cal. 
219 [17 P.2d 1001] ; County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal. 
2d 192,203-205 [44 P.2d 340, 100 A.L.R. 149] ; King v. Samuel, 
7 Cal.App. 55 [93 P. 391] ; Wetherbee v. Johnston, 10 Cal.App. 
264 [101 P. 802] ; Main v. Thornton, 20 Cal.App. 194 [128 P. 
766]. 
The peremptory writ should be denied. 
Curtis, J'J concurred. 
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